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Based on a cash-in-advance approach, this paper investigates theoretically the determinants of
money holdings of firms under the conditions of a highly regulated labor market and analyses em-
pirically the demand for money of German businesses during the period 1960–1998. As a result of
our theoretical analysis the demand for cash balances by firms for shadow market activities depends
among other things positively on the expected wage wedge. The empirical results show that the
coefficient of the wage wegde has a positive sign in the long-run cointegrating relationship and is
statistically significant positive in the short-run dynamics of the error correction model.
Key words:  Money Demand by Firms, Wage Wedge, Cash-in-Advance Model, Cointegration,
Error-Correction
Auf der Grundlage eines Cash-in-advance-Ansatzes untersucht der vorliegende Beitrag die B e-
stimmungsgründe der Geldnachfrage von deutschen Unternehmen (1960–1998) – vor dem Hinter-
grund eines hoch regulierten Arbeitsmarktes. Das theoretische Modell ergibt, daß Unternehmen
Kasse für Aktivitäten auf dem Markt für Schwarzarbeit unterhalten und zwar um so mehr, je größer
die Kluft zwischen den Bruttoarbeitskosten und den Nettolöhnen ("wage wedge") ist. Der Koeffizi-
ent der "wage wedge" weist ein positives Vorzeichen in der Kointegrationsbeziehung auf und ist
statistisch signifikant positiv in der kurzfristigen Dynamik des Fehler-Korrektur-Modells.
Schlagworte: Geldnachfrage von Unternehmen, Cash-in-advance-Modell, Kointegration,  Fehler-
Korrektur-Modell, Lohnzusatzkosten
JEL-Klassifikation: E41, C22, J30The Demand for Money by Private Firms 2
1  INTRODUCTION
1
While empirical investigations into the properties of money demand have tended to throw their ef-
forts on the aggregate level, the famous "finance motive" of money holdings put forward by Keynes
(1936) and the early theoretical investigations by Baumol (1956) and Miller and Orr (1966) using
an inventory-theoretic framework seem to point more at the business sector than at the aggregate
level. More recently, there have been only a few remarkable studies on the money demand of firms
(Fase and Winder 1990; Barr and Cuthbertson 1992; Mizen 1996; Viren 1996; Mulligan 1997). As
it appears to us, none of the authors mentioned, however, has attempted to link money demand of
the business sector to the demand for labor on informal, likewise grey labor markets in the shadow
economy.
It is a matter of daily observation in highly industrialized economies that firms are inclined to hire
work from informal markets whenever the burden of labor costs - in addition to the wage rate be-
fore taxes - makes this alternative profitable vis-à-vis the formal labor market. The sector of hous-
ing and construction is a typical and perhaps the most prominent example where companies draw
heavily on labor input from informal sources and do hold cash exactly for this purpose. We are not
so much interested - as some of the mentioned papers are - in the existence of economies of scale
in the demand for cash by firms. Moreover, our main focus is on the determinants of money hold-
ings by firms under the conditions of a highly regulated economy, especially in the labor market.
In glancing through the literature, it turned out that for the attempt to model firms' money demand
in such an environment, much can be learned from a body of literature interested in - at first sight -
quite a different issue, namely the demand for money in an economy with various constraints (Lane
1990a, 1990b, 1992). In these papers, Lane models households as choosing optimal money holdings
subject to constraints in formal and informal goods as well as foreign exchange markets during the
socialist experiment. Also, Lane incorporates the precautionary motive of money holdings into his
analysis. In the firms’ view of our own work, this can be translated into a precautionary finance
motive on the background of informal labor supply. The cash-in-advance approach chosen by Lane
will be used, here, as well. Recently, Bohl and Sell (1998) have done a similar methodological ex-
ercise for the demand for currency in an open economy.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following chapter 2, our own model will be presented. In
section 3, the derived money demand function is subject to an empirical test with data from Ger-
                                                
1  We thank Axel Jochem and Jochen Michaelis for their invaluable comments to section 2. Also, we thank the partici-
pants of the session „Labor Market Economics“ at the 47
th conference of the International Atlantic Economic So-
ciety, March 16-23, 1999. The usual disclaimer applies.2  The Model 3
many applying modern econometric techniques. Thereafter, we will give a brief review on the em-
pirical results achieved by other studies on the money demand of firms in section 4. Finally, in sec-
tion 5, we give a summary of our results and some hints as to future research necessities.
2  THE MODEL
The following analysis is not only a full application, but also an extension of Lane’s (1992) cash-in-
advance model for the household money demand in Poland to firms' money demand in a market
economy with a significant shadow economy. A representative firm  maximizes expected output,
which is a function of labor input, over an infinite time horizon. The firm holds two cash balances,
both in domestic money. Purchases of labor input must be backed with money. Apparently, this
assumption only applies to a minority of sectors in a modern economy and, in the past, it could be
most likely found in the services and/or in the construction sector. For simplicity, it is assumed that
labor is the only factor of production. The price for labor is lower in the shadow economy, but the
quantity available there is limited and uncertain, whereas in the official market, the firm may hire
labor as much as desired, but at a higher price. Therefore, domestic currency is held in preparation
for hiring labor at a favorable price on the parallel labor market.
2
The timing of transactions in the model is as follows. In the morning, the firm hires workers in the
two markets, constrained by money held over from the previous day. In the afternoon, the firm’s
production is sold. There are no other financial assets. The price and the available quantity of labor
in the shadow economy, as well as the price of labor in the official market, are treated as random
variables, whose realization is not known until the beginning of the day.
The firm maximizes expected output y, which is a function of factor input, i t, over an infinite hori-
zon:
(1)  max  ( ) !
0
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where Et denotes the expectations operator conditional on information available at time t. b is a dis-
count factor and EO stands for expected output. For the sake of simplicity, factors of production
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where 
o
t f  and 
s
t f  is the amount of labor hired in the official market and the shadow economy, re-
spectively. Maximizing output, as stated in equation (1), is, according to duality theory (NicholsonThe Demand for Money by Private Firms 4
1992), equivalent to the minimization of costs for a given (but not necessarily constant over time)








t t l f l f TC + = ). Insofar, our approach is capable to explore the optimal pro-
duction plan of the firm. In addition, we have a view on the optimal financial plan of the firm: the
firm’s financial budget constraint for each period requires that expenses for labor during the period
plus end-of-period money holdings are financed by money carried over from the previous period
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where 
o
t l  denotes the price of labor on the official market, 
s
t l  the price of labor in the shadow econ-
omy, 
o d
t m  the money holdings for the official market and 
s d
t m  the money holdings for the shadow
market.
From first glance, the distinction between two different cash holdings - one legal and one illicit - of
the same currency by a representative firm may seem to be artificial. But one should be aware of the
fact that legal cash belongs to the official assets of the firm and, hence, enters the firm’s books
while illicit cash never does. Moreover, in making the distinction between these two components of
currency demand, we follow the procedure of Bhattacharyya (1990). As opposed to Bhattacharyya,
however, here both components and its economic determinants will be derived from optimality
conditions in a constrained maximisation problem. Expenses for hiring labor in the shadow econ-
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Previous money holdings for the shadow labor market can hence either be interpreted as an ex-
haustible resource which diminishes over time or as a variable which is exogenous to the model!
4
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The amount of labor that the firm can hire in the shadow economy is taken to be limited by the
availability of supply. The risk for that labor in the parallel market is to be detected, rises with the
                                                                                                                                                                 
2  See Sell (1997) for an analysis of the income velocity of money in the informal sector.
3  For a constant price level of one, production equals sold output:  1. for  = = t t t t p Y y p
4  There are a number of possibilities to endogenize the process of replenishing illicit cash balances. For instance, we
could argue that output (see equation three above) can be sold on official as well as on parallel markets, the latter2  The Model 5
unofficial wage rate, because authorities will amplify controls when observing the latter to increase.
Hence, the wage rate is lower than the one which would equal demand and supply on the parallel
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where the quantity of labor available is 
A
t f . There are also nonnegativity conditions on the holdings
of the two cash balances and on the hiring of labor in the two markets:
5










The firm, therefore, maximizes the expected discounted value of production (equation  (1)) with
respect to the quantities of hired labor (in each market) and to the holdings of legal and illicit cash
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the expected maximized present value of production from period t + 1 onward as a function of
money carried over from period t, the Lagrangean for each period t can be written as follows:
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where qt is the excess price for labor to be payed by entrepreneurs in the official market relative to
the market in the shadow economy. We shall call it the "wage wedge" hereafter. By this we mean
(as a percentage rate) the wedge between labor costs and net income of employees (take home pay).
The price which accrues from hiring labor in the official market can be calculated according to the
compensation of employees concept (Hinze 2000). In this concept it is assumed that firms have to
                                                                                                                                                                 
implying a good’s price free of taxes. The revenue on the parallel goods market, then would serve to replenish illicit
cash in order to hire labor on the shadow labor market in the next period.
5  There are three sources for domestic demand for cash balances: legal and illicit cash of firms, cash balances of pri-
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afford – in excess of gross wages and salaries – the respective social security payroll tax. Opposed
to this, the employees' utility reservation wage level corresponds to the net income of employees
(wages/salaries) after deduction for personal income tax and social security contributions. The price
for hiring labor in the shadow economy equals in equilibrium by and large the utility reservation
wage level from the official economy.
Using this device, one obtains the following first order conditions for hiring labor in the two mar-
kets:
(11)  ( )
'
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where the li,t (i = 1,...,8) are static Lagrangean multipliers. Equations (11) and (12) are the first or-
der conditions for hiring labor in the two markets. As in Lane (1992) we assume, for simplicity, that
some labor is hired in each of the two labor markets in each period so that l7,t = l8,t = 0. Otherwise,
the tax authorities could anticipate a production in the shadow economy. Hence, conditions (11) and
(12) can shortened to become:







, 3 , 1 , 0 ' l l l
¶
¶
+ + = =







, 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 , 0 ' l l l l l
¶
¶
+ + + + = =
Conditions (13) and (14) can be combined to yield:
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which, solved for l2,t , gives:
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Introducing (16) into (14), we get:
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Rearranging (16) gives (18):2  The Model 7
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we can rewrite (21) to become:
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The wedge between the prices of labor in the official and in the parallel market is either associated
with shortages in the parallel labor market (l4,t) or with a lack of money to pay labor there (l2,t). In
other words, given the low prices but limited quantities in the parallel labor market, firms either hire
everyone who is available at the low wage costs (still taking into account the non-negativity condi-
tion (8)), or run out of illicit cash in the attempt.
Next, consider the conditions for optimal holdings of legal and illicit cash:
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Using the definition of the value function:
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That is, legal cash is expected to contribute to future production by easing the budget constraint
(reflected in l1,t) as well as to the extent that it may ease a cash-in-advance constraint (l3,t). Holding
illicit cash is expected to ease the budget constraint (l1,t) and two cash-in-advance constraints (l2,t,
l3,t). In the mathematical annex, we show how the four mentioned first order conditions can be
combined to yield a proxy for the determinants of illegal and legal cash. Namely, in equation (57) –
see annex – we find a formulation for the relative attractiveness to hold illicit rather than legal cash.
Equation (59),
6 which is a second-order Taylor approximation of equation (57), can then be used to
provide a portfolio-theoretic rationale for the (il)legal demand for domestic currency. First, the de-
mand for (il)legal cash depends (positively) negatively on the expected excess price of labor in the
official market over the price of labor in the parallel market. This labor price premium is divided by
the expected parallel market wage increase factor, which deflates the expected labor price premium.
Second, the higher the parallel market wage increase factor, the (lower) higher is demand for
(il)legal cash, ceteris paribus. Demand for (il)legal cash depends on the variances and covariances
of labor input and wage inflation on the parallel market. The implication of the variance of labor
input is ambiguous and depends on the third derivative of the production function y’’’. Third, a
higher variance of wage inflation on the parallel market is associated with a (higher) lower demand
for (il)legal cash. Also, the demand for (il)legal cash is (negatively) positively related to the covari-
ance between expected labor input and the expected wage premium of the official over the parallel
market. In the same vein, the demand for (il)legal cash is (positively) negatively associated with the
                                                
6  See the mathematical annex for a full and step by step derivation of equation (59).3  Data and Empirical Results 9
covariance between expected labor input and wage inflation on the parallel market. Fourth, the de-
mand for (il)legal cash is (negatively) positively related to the covariance between wage inflation on
the parallel market and the wage premium of the official over the parallel market. Taking into con-
sideration the role of output in equation (3) and the fact that labor input is not an observable vari-
able, the demand for (il)legal cash can be expressed as a function of the following five determi-
nants:
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Hence, mutatis mutandis demand for illicit cash reads:
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It comes as no surprise that neither legal nor illicit cash depend on the interest rate or on any other
opportunity cost variable – given that there are no other financial assets than money (see above) in
the model.
7 As both components of currency demand are not observable individually, there seems to
be a problem to estimate a currency demand of firms equation. As only production enters into both
components/demand functions with the same sign and both demand functions are symmetric in all
the other variablers with regard to the sign, one way out would be to estimate a cash demand by
firms function, where only production enters as a determinant. The disadvantage of doing so, how-
ever, would consist in losing all the additional information embedded in the components (32), (33).
Hence, a second way out consists in building the aggregate as in Bhattacharyya (1990):
(34) 
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If the illicit (official) component dominates, then the estimated five compound coefficients in (34)
should have the following signs: a, b, d > 0 (<0), but g, e < 0 (>0).
3  DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The time series used in our study are annual observations covering the period from 1960 to 1998.
The monetary aggregate for the business sector consists of cash balances and sight deposits and is
from the financial accounts for Germany published by the Deutsche Bundesbank (Deutsche Bun-
desbank 1994, 1999). The statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank (Finanzierungsrechnung) do not
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allow for a breakdown of money holdings into cash and sight deposits (Brümmerhoff 1985). There-
fore, when estimating money demand functions of firms instead of demand for cash balances func-
tions (Bohl and Sell 1998) of these firms, additional motives of holding sight deposits which go
beyond the scope of this paper come into play. The other problem – that a breakdown of the sec-
tors’, and hence also firms’ cash holdings into their (its) different components is usually unavailable
– is not a hindering factor in principle for our empirical analysis, as we have shown in the last sec-
tion. Financial assets and liabilities of firms are derived from the statistics of financial institutions
and not from the balance sheets of the firms (Bundesbank 1999). This makes sure that we deal with
net financial assets which are not those observed by the fiscal authorities and can be subject of
payments to the shadow economy. Information on cash holdings of firms result from consistency
rules applied to all gross and net balances for the non-financial sectors and should, hence, cover all
(legal and illicit) cash transactions of this sector. We deflate this time series by the GDP deflator to
construct real money balances mt. The GDP deflator is taken from the annual report of the German
Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat 2001). The gross value added of the business
sector in constant prices serves as the scale variable yt.
What about the size of the shadow economy in Germany? Recent calculations by Schneider (1999)
say that the income generated in the parallel economy at the beginning of the new century corre-
sponds to approximately 15 % of GDP. Empirical estimates with econometric techniques (Karmann
1986, 1990) show that the share of the shadow economy was almost zero in Germany in 1970.
Since then, it has been rising and reached a level of 10 % of GNP already in 1990. If Schneider’s
recent calculations are correct, the speed of growth of the hidden economy has accelerated during
the 1990s.
To construct the wage wedge wt we divide the total cost per employee (according to the compensa-
tion of employee concept) by the net wage/salary per employee. This ratio was 1.376 at in 1960 and
has increased meanwhile (1999) to a level of approximately 1.934. Between 1960 and 1970 the ra-
tio remained rather stable. Since 1970, however, the ratio has been ascending considerably. This
finding matches nicely the behavior of the shadow economy (see above). Only since the end of the
1990s we do experience a relaxation in the speed of increase. The time series on which we build our
empirical analysis are from the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (Hinze 2000).
The variables mt, yt and wt are in logarithms and refer from 1990 onwards to West and East Ger-
many. To use actual rather than expected values of the wage wedge, we rely on the argument put
forward by Taylor (1991), according to which the application of cointegration techniques allows to3  Data and Empirical Results 11
test our money demand function subject only to the very weak assumption that forecasting errors
are stationary.
To investigate the degree of integration of the times series we employ the test suggested by Kwiat-
kowski et al. (1992), hereafter KPSS test. In the KPSS test the null hypothesis of the stationarity of
a variable is tested against the alternative of a unit root. The results of these tests for the null hy-
pothesis of level stationarity and trend stationarity employing the truncation lags from 0 to 3 are
reported in Table 1 where the maximum lag length is chosen due to the suggestion in Schwert
(1987) l = int {4(T/100)
1/4}. The KPSS tests are performed for the variables mt, yt and wt assuming
that the other variables in our money demand equation are stationary time series. As can be seen in
Table 1, the null hypotheses of level and trend stationarity are rejected for all three time series be-
cause the test statistics are significant at the five per cent level. Hence, we assume that mt, yt and wt
are integrated of order one.
Next, we estimate and test for cointegration relying on the Johansen procedure ( Johansen 1988,
1991) and the Engle-Granger approach (Engle and Granger 1987) between the  instationary time
series. Panel A in Table 2 presents the tests of the null hypothesis of r cointegrating vectors using
the trace test. The test statistics show the existence of a single cointegrating relationship because the
null hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors is rejected at the five per cent level while the hypothe-
sis that the number of cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to one cannot be rejected. The un-
derlying VAR model has the lag length one and the LM-type tests (LM1, LM4) show the absence of
first and fourth order autocorrelation. When looking at the estimated cointegrating vector (after
normalizing on mt) the long-run income elasticity is close to one and the coefficient of the wage
wedge has a positive sign. Additional insights into the cointegrating relationship between the three
variables can be obtained by examining the results of the  Engle-Granger approach in Panel B.
Cointegrating Durbin-Watson (CRDW) as well as cointegrating Dickey-Fuller (CRDF) test statis-
tics are significant and reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Compared with the findings of
the Johansen procedure in Panel A the estimated coefficient of the scale variable is again close to
one and the estimated parameter of the wage wedge has a positive sign.
Having analysed the stochastic properties of the individual time series and the long-run relationship
we have estimated an error correction model which includes all explanatory variables of our money
demand function. Starting with this general specification we have excluded step by step the vari-
ables with statistically insignificant coefficients at the five per cent level. The result of this general-
to-specific testing strategy is the following error correction model:The Demand for Money by Private Firms 12
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The model contains as explanatory arguments the stationary long-run relationship between real
money, the scale variable and the wage wedge and in addition only the lagged wage wedge as an
explanatory variable of the short-run dynamics. The parameter on the wage wedge has a positive
sign. All other arguments of our money demand model were statistically insignificant. This result is
not contradictory to the implications of the model (see equations (32) and (33)). As the statistics of
business cash balances and sight deposits are not calculated from the firms‘ books, but from sources
of the consolidated monetary sector, they represent a real "mix" of legal and illicit cash motives. A
positive sign of the wage wedge in the above estimation equation, hence, is a signal for a significant
(and dominant) influence of the parallel labor market on the money holdings of the firms. The coef-
ficient of the error correction term is statistically significant different form zero which confirms the
findings of the cointegration analyses. Furthermore, the residuals of the error correction model ex-
hibit no autocorrelation as can be seen by the Durbin-Watson (DW) and Ljung-Box (Q(df)) tests. In
addition, the RESET test shows that there is no functional misspecification. Measured by the ad-
justed coefficient of determination  ) (
2 R  the explanatory power of the model is acceptable. In
summary, the error correction model has statistically and economically sensible characteristics and
describes the behavior of the demand for money quite well.
4  FINDINGS OF RELATED STUDIES AND COMPARISON WITH
OUR RESULTS
As mentioned in the introduction, our study is part of the small literature on the money demand of
firms so that it is sensible to review this branch of studies and compare their findings with our own
results. Meltzer (1963), Whalen (1965) and Vogel and Maddala (1967) wrote the first articles in-
vestigating the behaviour of demand for money of companies and stimulated subsequent research
activities. More recently, Fase and Winder (1990) specify error correction models to study aggre-
gate and sectorally disaggregated money demand functions for M1 and M2 in the Netherlands over
the period from 1970 to 1988. An income elasticity of unity was found for the business sector, the
household and the aggregate money demand functions irrespective of the money definition used.
The interest and inflation elasticities for the business sector are systematically higher in absolute4  Findings of Related Studies and Comparison with Our Results 13
terms than the values of the household sector money demand functions and the aggregate demand
for money functions. Again, these findings are insensitive to the usage of different money defini-
tions and could be a result of the greater scope which the business sector has for conducting active
and systematic cash management compared with the household sector. In addition, Fase and Winder
experiment with a cyclical indicator as part of the short-term dynamics and as a proxy for the costs
of real assets for which the liquid financial assets are a substitute. The coefficients of this variable in
all money demand functions for the business sector are statistically insignificant different from zero.
Barr and Cuthbertson (1992) analyse the company sector liquid asset holdings in the United King-
dom within a system framework for the period from 1976 to 1986. They implement cointegration
techniques and obtain asset demand functions which satisfy the theoretical restrictions. The esti-
mated demand functions are intuitively plausible and exhibit parameter stability. The demand of the
company sector for liquid assets depends on various rates of return and on wealth. In Mizen (1996),
a forward-looking buffer stock model for the company sector in the United Kingdom over the pe-
riod from 1970 to 1988 is specified. The results suggest that the buffer stock models for the money
demand behaviour of the company sector are validated and that businesses hold money for the in-
sulation against unanticipated shocks. Compared with the findings from studies on aggregate money
demand functions the long-run cointegrating relationships reflect a different behaviour of the com-
pany sector, their money holdings are far more volatile and may well be interrelated with bank
lending and net trade credit arrangements. These results are not surprising because the company
sector actively monitors and adjusts its balances far more often than the personal sector.
Among the recent investigations on the demand for money of companies there are two cross-
sectional studies which should be mentioned. Mulligan (1997) provides a cross-sectional study of
the demand for money relying on 12,000 firms in the United States for the period from 1961 to
1992. The money demand function considered relates money holdings to the volume of sales, the
opportunity cost of holding money and the value of the cash manager’s time. His findings indicate
that there are economies of scale and that companies headquartered in countries with high wages
hold more money for a given level of sales.  The estimated scale as well as wage elasticities are by
and large of equal amount and lie around 0.8 and the interest elasticity is statistically significant
negative. Viren (1997) analyses the relationship between the demand for cash and the transactions
volume by 2,700 Finnish firms. Relying on this cross-section of business firms the findings show
economies of scale and that the relationship of demand for cash and the transaction volume differs
across the branches of the economy. Cash is not predominantely used in the shadow economy and is
still a competitive means of payment in the service sector of the Finnish economy.The Demand for Money by Private Firms 14
The review of the existing literature on the money demand of firms demonstrates that none of the
studies has investigated theoretically nor empirically the importance of the demand for labor in the
shadow market for the firms’  money demand. The investigations rely mostly on the inventory theo-
retical model put forward by  Baumol (1956) and Tobin (1956), while our own estimated money
demand function is based on Lane's (1992) cash-in-advance model. The findings of the studies
mentioned above can be reconciled with our own results concerning long-run elasticity of the scale
variable because the estimated values are comparable. To our knowledge there is no investigation
on the demand for money of firms for Germany. Virtually all studies analyse the aggregate money
demand for M1 and M3 (see, for example, Falk and Funke 1995, Hansen and Kim 1995 and Wol-
ters et al. 1998). Comparing their findings with our results, it is interesting to note that the long-run
elasticity of the scale variable is generally well above one, while the estimated long-run elasticity of
the scale variable in the firms’ money demand is near one. When looking at the error correction
model the estimated parameter of the error correction term in our model is higher in absolute terms.
This indicates faster adjustment towards equilibrium on the firms’ level than on the aggregate level.
5  SUMMARY
Based on Lane’s (1992) cash-in-advance approach, the paper investigates theoretically the determi-
nants of money holdings of firms under the conditions of a highly regulated labor market and analy-
ses empirically the demand for money of German businesses during the period from 1960 to 1998.
The paper differs from previous studies because none of these has attempted to link money demand
of firms to the demand for labor in the shadow economy. Moreover, there are no empirical investi-
gations concerning the demand for money of German firms.
As a result of our theoretical analysis the demand for cash balances by firms for shadow market
activities depends among other things positively on the expected wage wedge, which is the excess
price for labor to be paid by firms in the official market relative to the price to be paid in the
shadow economy. Relying on this theoretical finding, we concentrate our interest on the importance
of the wage wedge as an explanatory argument of a money demand function for German firms. The
empirical results support the theoretical findings in the sense that the coefficient of the wage wegde
has a positive sign in the long-run cointegrating relationship. Furthermore, the wage wedge appears
with a statistically significant positive parameter in the short-run relationship of the error correction
model, which captures the money demand behavior of German firms quite well. Hence, the results
point at the relevance of illicit cash as a part of firms’ money demand during the period under
analysis.REFERENCES
Agénor, P.-R. and P. R. Masson (1999), Credibility, Reputation, and the Mexican Peso Crisis,
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 31, 70–84.
Ahluwalia, P. (2000), Discriminating Contagion: An Alternative Explanation of Contagious Cur-
rency Crises in Emerging Markets, IMF Working Paper/00/14, Washington, D. C.
Barr, D. G. and K. Cuthbertson (1992), Company Sector Liquid Asset Holdings: A System A p-
proach, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 24, 83–97.
Bhattacharyya, D. K. (1990), An Econometric Method of Estimating the “Hidden Economy”, Uni-
ted Kingdom (1960 – 1984): Estimates and Tests, The Economic Journal 100, 703–717.
Baumol, W. J. (1956), The Transactions Demand for Cash: An Inventory Theoretic Approach, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 66, 545–556.
Bohl, M. T. and F. L. Sell (1998), Demand for Cash Balances in Germany: Theoretical Underpin-
nings and Empirical Evidence, Applied Economics 30, 1017–1026.
Brümmerhoff, D. (1985), Die gesamtwirtschaftliche Finanzierungsrechnung, in: W. Ehrlicher and
D. Simmert (Eds.), Der volkswirtschaftliche Sparprozeß, Beihefte zu Kredit und Kapital,
Heft 9, Berlin, 89–111.
Deutsche Bundesbank (1994), Ergebnisse der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Finanzierungsrechnung für
Westdeutschland 1960 bis 1992, Statistische Sonderveröffentlichungen Nr. 4, Frankfurt am
Main.
Deutsche Bundesbank (1997), Ergebnisse der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Finanzierungsrechnung für
Deutschland 1990 bis 1996, Statistische Sonderveröffentlichungen Nr. 4, Frankfurt am
Main.
Deutsche Bundesbank (1999), Ergebnisse der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Finanzierungsrechnung für
Deutschland 1990 bis 1998, Statistische Sonderveröffentlichungen Nr. 4, Frankfurt am
Main.
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (1997),  Vierteljährige Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamt-
rechnung, Berlin.
Engle, R. F. and C. W. J. Granger (1987), Co-integration and Error Correction: Representation,
Estimation and Testing, Econometrica 55, 251–276.References 16
Engle, R. F. and B. S. Yoo (1987), Forecasting and Testing in Co-Integrated Systems, Journal of
Econometrics 35, 143–159.
Falk, M. and N. Funke (1995), The Stability of Money Demand in Germany and in the EMS: Im-
pact of German Unification, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 131, 470–488.
Fase, M. M. G. and C. C. A. Winder (1990), The Demand for Money in the Netherlands Revisited,
De Economist 138, 276–301.
Hansen, G. and H. R. Kim (1995), The Stability of German Money Demand: Tests of the Cointe-
gration Relation, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 131, 276–301.
Hinze, J. (2000), Relation zwischen Bruttoarbeitskosten und Nettolöhnen, HWWA Report Nr. 202,
Hamburg Institute of International Economics, Hamburg.
Johansen, S. (1988), Statistical Analysis of Cointegration Vectors, Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control 12, 231–254.
Johansen, S. (1991), Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of  Cointegration Vectors in  Gaussian
Vector Autoregressive Models, Econometrica 59, 1551–1580.
Karmann, A. (1990), Schattenwirtschaft und ihre Ursachen: Eine empirische Analyse zu
Schwarzwirtschaft und Selbstversorgung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Zeitschrift für
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften 110 (2), 185–206.
Karmann, A. (1986), Monetäre Schätzansätze zur Erfassung der Schattenwirtschaft: Ein Vergleich
verschiedener Meßmethoden, Kredit und Kapital 19 (2), 233–247.
Keynes, J. M. (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, New York.
Kwiatkowski, D. et al. (1992), Testing the Null Hypothesis of Stationarity against the Alternative of
a Unit Root, Journal of Econometrics 54, 159–178.
Lane, T. D. (1990a), The Demand for Money in Poland: Theory and Evidence, Mimeo, IMF Rese-
arch Department, New York.
Lane, T. D. (1990b), Costly Portfolio Adjustment and the Short-Run Demand for Money, Economic
Inquiry 28, 466–487.
Lane, T. D. (1992), Household Demand for Money in Poland, IMF Staff Papers 39, 825–854.
MacKinnon, J. G. (1991), Critical Values for Cointegration Tests, in: R. F.  Engle and C. W. J.
Granger (eds), Long-Run Economic Relationships Readings in Cointegration, Oxford, 267–
276.References 17
Meltzer, A. H. (1963), The Demand for Money: A  Cross-Section Study of Business Firms, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 77, 405–422.
Miller, M. H. and D. Orr (1966), A Model of the Demand for Money by Firms, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 80, 413–435.
Mizen, P. (1996), Modeling the Demand for Money in the Industrial and Commercial Companies
Sector in the United Kingdom, Journal of Policy Modeling 18, 445–467.
Mulligan, C. B. (1997), Scale Economies, the Value of Time, and the Demand for Money: Longitu-
dinal Evidence from Firms, Journal of Political Economy 105, 1061–1079.
Nicholson, W. (1992), Microeconomic  Theory: Basic  Principles and Extensions, 5
th ed., Fort
Worth.
Osterwald-Lenum, M. (1992), A Note with Quantiles of the Asymptotic Distribution of the Maxi-
mum Likelihood Cointegration Rank Test Statistics, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Sta-
tistics 54, 461–471.
Sachverständigenrat (1997), Jahresgutachten 1997/98 des Sachverständigenrates zur Begutachtung
der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Stuttgart.
Seitz, F. (1995), Der DM-Umlauf im Ausland, Diskussionspapier Nr. 1, Volkswirtschaftliche For-
schungsgruppe der Deutschen Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main.
Schneider, F. (1999), Schwarzarbeit legt um 7,5% zu, Handelsblatt from 13 December 1999, 6.
Schwert, G. W. (1989), Tests for Unit Roots: A Monte Carlo Investigation, Journal of Business and
Economic Statistics 7, 147–159.
Sell, F. L. (1997), Zu den langfristigen Bestimmungsgründen der Umlaufgeschwindigkeit des Gel-
des: Ein sektoraler Ansatz, Kredit und Kapital 30, 325–347.
Taylor, M. P. (1991), The Hyperinflation Model of Money Demand Revisited, Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking 23, 326–351.
Tobin, J. (1956), The Interest-Elasticity of Transactions Demand for Money, The Review of Econo-
mics and Statistics 38, 241–247.
Viren, M. (1996), Demand for Cash by Business Firms, Working Paper, Bank of Finland, Helsinki.
Vogel, R. C. and G. S. Maddala (1967), Cross-Section Estimates of Liquid Asset Demand by Ma-
nufacturing Corporations, Journal of Finance 22, 557–575.References 18
Wahlen, E. L. (1965), A Cross-Section Study of Business Demand for Cash, Journal of Finance 20,
423–443.
Wolters, J., Teräsvirta, T. and H. Lütkepohl (1998), Modeling the Demand for M3 in the Unified
Germany, The Review of Economics and Statistics 80, 399–409.MATHEMATICAL ANNEX
Equation (30) inserted into (26) and (31) inserted into (28) gives:
(35)  ( ) t t t t t E , 5 , 1 1 , 3 1 , 1 l l l l b + = + + +
(36)  ( ) t t t t t t E , 6 , 1 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 l l l l l b + = + + + + +
Equations (35) and (36) can be simplified by assuming that 0 , 6 , 3 = = t t l l . In this case, illicit cash is
also used as a long term store of value and the firm thus does not exhaust its illicit cash this period
(later, we will proceed in the same way with regard to legal cash). Hence, neither the overall cash-
in-advance constraint (equation (5)) nor the nonnegativity constraint on illicit cash balances (equa-
tion (7)) is binding in period t. Solving (13) and (14) for l1,t (and for l1,t + l2,t, respectively) leads to
(38) and (40) respectively:
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Applying (40) to the next period and inserting into (36) gives:
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Introducing (38) into (43) yields:


















































































Introducing (46) into (45) gives:
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Insert (51) into (49) to get:Mathematical Annex 21
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Next, the condition for optimal holdings of legal cash can be written as:
(53)  ( ) t t t t E , 5 , 1 1 , 1 l l l b + = +
Applying (38) to the next period and inserting (43) yields:
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Inserting into (54) gives:
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t l l p + = + 1 1 , we get:
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As  ( ) ( ) ( ) z E w E z w E t t t b b b + = + , the term  ( ) 1 , 0 + - t t E l b  in equation (57) disappears!
Using (51) instead of (10), (57) becomes:










































The left hand side of equation (57) can be interpreted as the expected production-weighted excess
return to holding illicit cash rather than legal cash. This expression can either be positive or zero as
the right-hand side can never turn negative taking into account that l5,t < 0. When the right-hand
side is positive, legal cash is held for transactions’ reasons, as the labor supply constraint on the
parallel market is binding. If the left-hand side of equation  (57) is zero, this implies thatMathematical Annex 22
0 1 , 4 , 5 = = + t t l l .
  Thus, the labor supply constraint on the parallel market is not binding this time, but
still some legal cash is held for other reasons than transactions in the legal labor market (legal cash
as a long-term store of value). In a rather realistic world, firms will always hold some legal cash for
hiring labor from the official market, otherwise the fiscal authorities will suspect production in the
shadow economy. Moreover, even if they could hire all labor required from the (cheaper) parallel
market, they will usually hold legal cash for other purposes. This is due to the fact that some cash
belongs to the firms's portfolio according to the beliefs of shareholders and tax authorities. Taking a
second-order Taylor approximation of equation (57) gives:
Proposition:
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The development of the this second order Taylor series with three variables follows the subsequent
rule:
Proof:
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We achieve the following parameter values:
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Table 1 - KPSS Tests
Panel A - KPSS Statistics for the Null of Level Stationarity
Truncation Lags
Variable 0 1 2 3
mt 3.43* 1.84* 1.29* 1.02*
yt 3.73* 1.95* 1.34* 1.04*
wt 3.70* 1.93* 1.33* 1.04*
Panel B - KPSS Statistics for the Null of Trend Stationarity
Truncation Lags
Variable 0 1 2 3
mt 0.53* 0.31* 0.23* 0.19*
yt 0.56* 0.30* 0.22* 0.18*
wt 0.49* 0.26* 0.19* 0.15*
Note: mt is real money balances of firms, yt real gross value added of the business sector and wt the wage wedge.
* denotes significant statistics at the five per cent level where the critical values are from  Kwiatkowski et al.
(1992).Mathematical Annex 25
Table 2 - Cointegration Tests
Panel A - Johansen Procedure
Null Trace LM1 LM4 Estimated Cointegrating Vector
r = 0 36.62* 10.45 4.82 mt = 0.98yt + 2.52wt
r £ 1 14.78
r £ 2 1.19
Panel B - Engle-Granger Approach
Cointegrating Regression: mt = - 3.10 + 1.01yt + 1.97wt + ut
Cointegrating Tests: CRDW = 1.32* CRDF = - 4.71*
Note: mt is real money balances of firms, yt real gross value added of the business sector and wt the wage wedge. The
VAR has the lag length one and includes a constant term. 
* denotes significant statistics at the five per cent level where critical values can be found in Engle and Yoo
(1987), MacKinnon (1991) and Osterwald-Lenum (1992).